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PANEL THREE:
INSURANCE AND THE LITIGATION PROCESS
OPENING
ROBERT L. LOFTS, MODERATOR*

We have a distinguished panel, as all Federalist panels are, starting
with Lynne Abraham, who is the District Attorney of the City of
Philadelphia; Richard Scruggs, who has been mentioned a number of
times here today, from Mississippi; Professor Richard Epstein from the
University of Chicago, who has been mentioned in glowing terms and, I
think, not so glowing by a few members of the audience; and Judge
Dennis Jacobs of the Second Circuit. I am Bob Lofts, and I am given the
title of moderator, but I have been given no stun gun with which to
control my panel.
Insurance is our topic and I have only a few observations to offer on
insurance and its impact on the litigation world. These come anecdotally
and not with data. The anecdotes are based on my thirty years of practice
in San Francisco, which may cause you to discount even the anecdotes as
being nonrepresentational.
First, at a basic level, insurance does increase litigation because with
the typical fender-bender, nobody is going to spend the time and money
to sue someone who has no insurance and little or no money. Moving up
the scale, one who has some money, but not a lot, and no insurance, will
probably not become a defendant either. That is because it is not going
to be worth the effort to chase that person down. It is also because of a
factor that figures not only in the low end of cases, but in the high end,
big money cases as well. Plaintiffs' lawyers are not collection lawyers.
They do not know how to enforce judgments. It is not a good use of their
time.
This impacts settlements in a number of ways. It starts with policy
limits. On the insurance defense side, the policy is most likely to be the
top dollar, because the plaintiff's lawyer does not want to make the effort
to go over the policy limits against the insured. However, if there is bad
faith or if one can open the policy and go against the insurance company,
that is a different story. But, just going against the insured to try to
recover the insurance and collect the excess is not something the plaintiff's
attorney is interested in doing. So the defense side knows it can buy
peace with that policy limit. The defense side also knows the plaintiff is
pushing for a high number to settle and, in many cases, the insured is also
* Member, Severson & Werson.
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pushing for a big number to settle, particularly in the case of lawyers,
accountants, doctors, directors, and officers.
Many of these people have significant assets beyond insurance, but I
am not aware of any significant number of cases where plaintiffs' lawyers
attempted to pursue assets beyond the insurance. Thus, the question
becomes the right between plaintiff and defendant over the policy limits,
and there are different people on different sides. As the former managing
partner of a law firm, I devoted a great deal of attention to what is the
appropriate level of insurance for professional practice.
The appropriate level of insurance really has nothing to do with the
amount of damage that my partners and I are capable of inflicting, such
as a bad securities offering or a bad form for a lender on which hundreds
of millions of dollars are lent in violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
There is not enough insurance in the world to cover some of the damage
that a lawyer can do. But there is enough insurance to buy a settlement
from a plaintiff's lawyer, and that is the kind of magic number we are
thinking about. We want a nice fat number that is enough to make the
plaintiffs go away. It is not going to make anybody whole, but at least the
plaintiffs are gone.
The second area that insurance impacts has more to do with process
than substance: the plaintiff normally gets the insurance policy. The
plaintiff is going to get the reservation of rights letter. He is going to
know about coverage disputes, and he is going to evaluate that in terms
of the demand that he makes-how much he thinks he can get-and it will
impact the insurance company and how much they will offer. So it is a
rational system.
However, problems arise when someone enters the system who does
not know how to play the game. Trouble can arise when dealing with
such a party. But otherwise, it is a system where the participants are
accustomed to dealing in certain ritual, and plaintiffs' lawyers understand
the ritual, the defense lawyers understand the ritual, and everyone
understands that they are really in the same situation-a claims settlement
process. It is a complicated and costly one, but it is really a claims
settlement process.
The insurance companies know that something is going to go off the
rails once in a while; they operate on an actuarial basis and expect their
lawyers to perform, but they expect them to perform actuarially, as well.
They have to be right most of the time and not too far wrong the rest of
the time. If they do that, the whole system will work. Somebody is
1. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1994). See generallyRobert
A. Cook, The Truth in Lending Act-A Review in Light of Its OriginalPurpose, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L. REv. Q. 357 (1995).
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paying for all of this, of course, but hopefully the people who are buying
the insurance are, as a group, paying for it.
The effect on the process, as I said, is pretty straightforward. In
larger scale cases the insurance tends to diminish in importance.
Certainly, there are large solvent defendants who have a great deal of
insurance, but we do not see it in the typical product liability case. There
will be layers of coverage, there will be very large deductibles, a
retention, and a very complicated insurance structure that does not impact
the process very much, because the insureds in those instances control the
defense. They control the choice of counsel and how the case is to be
defended.
The larger cases with multiple insurers are good for lawyers because,
frequently, excess carriers claim that the primary carrier should have
settled within the primary limits and failed to, and, therefore, the excess
carrier is not liable at all. Also, as we see with alarming frequency, the
excess carriers say they did not even know there was a case until the
judgment came in, so they did not have any opportunity to protect
themselves. Insurance thereby creates more litigation among insurers
passing the buck around, and that is going to be our theme this afternoon.

TEN WHOLE MINUTES IN WHICH NOTHING BAD IS SAID
ABOUT INSURANCE COMPANIES
THE HONORABLE DENNIS JACOBS, FIRST PANELIST*

It has been frequently claimed that tort law principles are ruining the
insurance companies by driving up premiums, narrowing coverage, and
making insurance unavailable. The topic I have been asked to talk about
today is a more provocative one, and that is the question of what influence
liability insurance has on the state of our tort law, which is assumed to be
bad -and is often referred to as the tort crisis.
My view is that though there may be a tort crisis, and although
insurance practices probably make it worse, there is not much that can be
done about it if insurance is to continue to work as it should. It certainly
appears that insurance companies, which hold the purse strings, could
exercise that power to fix what is wrong with tort law, but I do not think
the state insurance commissioners would think much of that. And if they
did approve, no one would want to buy an insurance policy that protects
the tort system instead of the policyholder. In any event, I am skeptical
about the idea that insurance, properly understood, is a suitable vehicle for
reforming what has gone haywire with our tort system and its doctrines,
practices, and verdicts.
Why is insurance such a poor instrument when it has such actual
advantages for correcting the tort system? First of all, insurance is a
contract, and this contract is a two-party affair. The public, of course,
has a strong interest in the vigorous enforcement of insurance polices. But
the public in the ordinary sense is not really a beneficiary of an insurance
policy (except in situations such as uninsured motorist schemes and other
exotica).
Insurance companies are obliged by contract to approach the defense
of each risk in terms of protecting the policyholder in that exigency, and
any other goal should be peripheral. Not only is that the way it is most
of the time, that is the way it should be, at least when an insurance
company is living up to its contractual obligations. If the overall system
is thereby disserved, then that is probably for the overall system to sort
out and compensate for.
The reason insurance is a bad instrument for correcting tort law is
reflected in a simple review of the basic terms of an insurance policy.
The two most elementary contract terms of primary and umbrella liability
coverage are the indemnity clause and the defense clause.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I am indebted to
Ben Lawsky for his advice and editorial assistance.
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The indemnity obligation binds an insurance company to reimburse the
policyholder for sums that are paid in damages "on account of" bodily
injury or property damage. This clause has very little to do with the
merits of a claim. The focus is on the money that is paid or that has to
be paid, and this is a judgment that does not discriminate much between
good claims and bad claims (except perhaps in terms of dollar value).
Thus, the most basic terms of a liability policy contemplate coverage,
subject to exclusions, even for bad claims, false claims, and other such
claims in which the plaintiff should take nothing because, in a perfect tort
system, there would be no liability at all.
If insurance worked any other way, it would not be worth having.
Since an insurance policy will cover a verdict that is unjust, it seems to
me it must also cover a settlement even of groundless claims-that is,
there should be coverage if there is even a slight prospect that the plaintiff
will recover on the claims. That does not mean that groundless claims are
not worth less than good ones, but it does mean that the insurance
company has to deal with them and has to represent the interests of the
policyholder in dealing with them.
Seen in this light, liability insurance protects the policyholder against
at least two kinds of risks within the scope of the coverage. One is losses
that the insured (or its product) causes and should therefore pay for. The
other is losses that are caused by the misfiring of the tort system and the
justice system. Sometimes, those dangers intimidate insurers into settling
by the sheer magnitude of the potential exposure, irrespective of the
merits. One example is provided by the Agent Orange cases)
In
approving a $180 million fund-virtually all of it insurance
money-created to settle that mammoth litigation, the district court
acknowledged that there was little proof supporting the theory that Agent
Orange caused bodily injury in the first place.2 Though that is probably
a misfiring of the tort system in certain respects, no one can doubt that the
insurers' contributions to that fund protected the manufacturers from a
great peril that was covered by insurance.
A similar effect is seen if one looks at the other basic benefit people
buy when they purchase primary or umbrella liability insurance, and that
is defense. The defense clause ordinarily includes, in addition to the
1. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). See generally Robert L. Rapin, Tort System on Trial, 98
YALE L.J. 813 (1989) (reviewing PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS
Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURT (1987)).
2. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 775-95. The

district court pointed out that a summary judgment motion on the causation issue had not
been made by the defendants. See id. at 782.
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stated policy limits, an undertaking to defend the policyholder on
potentially covered claims and to do so at the expense of the insurance
company. Obviously, this is a very expensive undertaking and is often
much more expensive than the indemnity payout. Of course, when the
defense is successful, it can be very cost-effective. On the other hand,
even a successful defense can be an enormous expenditure and may dwarf
any settlement. Insurers thereby have an obvious incentive to value claims
early and to settle them-or at least one would think so. Few trial judges
would characterize insurance claims personnel as supine, but there is an
incentive to settle that is created by the defense clause, and insurance
companies will very carefully gauge what their outlay is for defense in
deciding and planning whether to settle certain cases.
The defense clause becomes a very powerful incentive in a long-tailed
mass tort situation that goes back many years and that involves large
insurance funds paid under old insurance policies. The old policies may
all have large limits remaining on them, but nobody ever thought they
were going to be worth anything. The insurance companies reacted first
with shock, but they are now educated to the fact that they have many old,
say twenty-year-old, insurance policies, and that they have to pay their
limits. The companies thus have a disincentive to fight those claims caseby-case and item-by-item. If they are going to pay their policy limits,
they would just as soon pay them and not pay for a scorched-earth,
burdensome, last-ditch series of defenses that will be in addition to the
policy limits.
It is arguable, of course, that this creates some of the problems that
we see in mass tort litigation. It is a chain reaction, to some extent. The
availability of funds from these old insurance policies to settle mass tort
claims, and the disincentive to litigate the claims under them, encourage
the wholesale enlistment of claimants who seek some sliver of a proposed
enormous fund. Then, since the insurance company and the manufacturer
of a product want to have a global settlement that takes in every possible
claimant, the threshold of injury is often lowered until the point where a
claim can be supported by symptoms that cannot be medically verified.
And of course, sometimes there may be claims based on medical
monitoring where absolutely no bodily injury, except in the future, is
contemplated at all.
The effect of this, in turn, is to assure that any fund of any size will
be inadequate to fund the loss, even if the tort loss itself-the actual bodily
injury or the property damage-is very small or largely illusory. Yet for
insurance companies and for their manufacturer insureds, the risk of noncontribution can be unacceptably great. If one manufacturer is left out of
an industry-wide global settlement, all the litigation artillery eventually
wheels around to focus on that one manufacturer-and its unhappy
insurance company.
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Through the handling of claims, the management of defense, and the
valuation of the claims, there is no doubt that insurers exercise a measure
of control over the costs of defense and, less effectively, over the amount
of the liability payout. However, though insurers have the power to
control these things in certain respects, it is very important to keep in
mind, for purposes of gauging the ability of the insurance system to
correct problems in the tort area, that insurance companies owe a singleminded duty of loyalty to the policyholder.
This loyalty principle of course maximizes the value of the insurance
product, but it is also necessary to counteract the built-in conflicts of
interests that insurance companies have when they defend policyholders
at their own expense, in addition to the policy limits. This ethic, this
single-minded duty of loyalty to an insured, does not come naturally to all
insurance companies. However, it is heavily reinforced by outside
influences, including market influence-people will buy insurance that
gives them coverage, but they will not buy insurance that is illusory-and,
of course, legal coercion.
In California and New Jersey, and maybe elsewhere, an insurance
company can be treated as a fiduciary of the policyholder. 3 There are
some thirty states-the first one was California-that have recognized a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in every insurance
policy. 4 Of course, there is nothing unusual about a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in contract law, but this statutory duty is not
grounded in the contract itself, because a breach of the insurance company
duty of good faith and fair dealings is treated as a tort. Bad faith conduct
under these tort statutes includes the denial of coverage that is later found
to have existed, a mechanism that increases the flow of insurance money
because it inhibits the assertion of arguable and even meritorious coverage
defenses.
Bad faith refusal to accept a settlement offer that is found to be
reasonable can also result in tort liability. 5 Of course, the determination
as to whether the settlement offer was reasonable is one that is made after
the jury has rendered its verdict, and that is another stimulus to the flow
3. See Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 721 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1986); Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 505, 507 (N.J. 1974).
4. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DisPuTEs 229, 571-82 (8th ed. 1995) (listing the following states: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,

Wyoming, and the Virgin Islands).
5. See id. at 534-35.
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of insurance money. The tort remedies that are available to punish the
failure to settle include, depending upon the state: the attorney's fees that
are incurred to win coverage;6 the policyholder's mental suffering;7 and,
of course, in some states, punitive damages.'
Moreover, in many
jurisdictions, intentional misconduct is not an element of this statutory tort
defense. 9 Liability attaches even if the insurance company had a good
faith basis for contesting the coverage or for not paying the claim.
It is easy to see how this affects coverage decisions and tends to
hydraulically draw insurance cash into the tort system.' 0 In some states,
either by statute or under common law, a bad faith failure of an insurance
company to pursue an opportunity to settle a claim within the policy limits
will open up the insurer to pay any resulting judgment, even if it exceeds
the policy limits." It may not be enough for the insurer to await
passively an offer to settle within the limits; the insurer owes the
policyholder a duty to go out and initiate discussions, if necessary, and to
follow up any promising settlement initiative. This is a very sharp spur,
and I would think that this certainly tends to increase the flow of money.
And if the tort crisis is viewed as something that is fueled by money, then
I guess insurance is fueling the tort crisis.
In fact, what is seen as the tort crisis today is, in part, the fallout from
the last great effort to utilize insurance as an engine of social progress: the
distribution of losses arising from the use of products, via strict liability.
As one commentator has written:
What allowed the rapid and successful development of tort law
into a significant compensation system was the emergence of a
6. See Kilroy Indus. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 847, 859 (C.D. Cal.
1985). See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 529-31, 557-67.
7. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-42 (Cal. 1973);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967); Farmers Group, Inc. v.
Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370, 1376-77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd en banc, 691 P.2d 1138
(Colo. 1984); Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiscus, 725 P.2d 234, 236 (Nev. 1986);
Twin City Fire Ins. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. 1995).

8. See generally OSTRAGER & NE-WMAN, supra note 4, at 532, 566.
9. See generally id. at 532, 560-67.
10. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners promulgates a model state
Unfair Insurance Practices Act. Versions have been adopted by 48 states, although only
five recognize a private right of action under the statute: Kentucky, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Montana, and West Virginia. Nevertheless, in other states, the model Act
reflects standards and obligations. Among those business practices barred by the Act in
California is the failure to attempt in good faith to settle claims in which liability is
reasonably clear. See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 536-43.

11. See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 849, 854 (N.Y. 1972).
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national insurance pool funded through premiums paid by large
corporate enterprises, in particular, products manufacturers. The
existence of seemingly inexhaustible financial resources allowed
courts and commentators to focus on the alleged socioeconomic
benefits to be derived from shifting the cost of accidents from
individual victims to large corporate enterprises that could either
buy insurance or self-insure. 2
However, the expansion of tort liabilities has driven some liability
coverages from the market, and made other coverages prohibitively
expensive. 13
Today, courts continue to treat insurance coverage and insurance
money as public resources suitable for achieving non-insurance goals, such
as environmental improvement 4 or asbestos cleanup in the schools.'5
Fortunately, courts do not have appropriated funds to spend on the public
good, but as George Priest has pointed out, the availability of insurance
has been useful in allowing courts to realize and implement social
goals.' 6 Courts have done so through a long-term, slow, incremental
process of restricting defenses to tort liability (such as contributory
negligence) by promoting doctrines that tend to expand liability, and by
"adopting the maximization of insurance coverage as the principal
interpretative objective in insurance disputes." '"
Of course, it is a familiar principle of insurance coverage law that
coverage grants be construed broadly and that exclusions be construed
narrowly. But when laudable social objectives can be accomplished with
insurance money, some courts-emphatically not all-simply invent
coverages and reduce exclusions to the vanishing point.
Because
insurance policies deal with future events, the contract terms are, by
12. Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Developments on Insurance: The
Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its PotentialSolution, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 285, 308
(1988); see also George L. Priest, The CurrentInsuranceCrisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-35 (1987).
13. As Robert Chesler has explained:
[T]he whole concept of strict liability is based on the ability of corporations to
abdicate those risks to the insurance industry, which then spreads them evenly
across society as a whole. If corporations are unable to use insurance to
spread the risk of strict liability, the whole scheme is called into question.
Joanne Wojcik, Deja Vu All over Again: New Coverage Suits Build on Old Cases, Bus.
INS., Feb. 29, 1996, at 2.
14. See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 401-92.

15. See generally id.
16. See Priest, supra note 12, at 1534-39.

17. Id. at 1534-35.
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nature, general. In order to maximize or find coverage, some courts treat
that generality as breadth or vagueness-or best of all, as ambiguity,
because ambiguous clauses are construed against the drafters. Moreover,
a number of opinions, overtly or subliminally, treat the maximization of
insurance proceeds for environmental cleanup as a public18 interest that is
appropriate to consider in construing insurance contracts.
It is wrong to say that insurance companies lack the means to
influence the tort system. Obviously, the system of fixing premiums
based on loss experience has been a way of controlling behavior. And
there have always been consultancy services, such as work site safety
inspections, that tend to reduce the amount of loss, the amount of risk,
and the amount of negligence out there in the world. But insurers seem
to have no way to influence the growth of liabilities that are not based on
the policyholder's failure or negligence. If the loss is the result of mass
hysteria or an opportunistic attack on a product or industry by tort
lawyers, there is little insurers can do to anticipate or to reduce that risk.
In sum, it is undeniable that insurance furnishes the money that fuels
the tort system, and that the insurance system-when it operates along
commercially fair and moral lines-increases the flow of cash. But
blaming insurance companies for what is wrong with the tort system is a
lot like blaming arson on oxygen.

18. See Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994); Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford

Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). See generally
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 426.

TOBACCO LITIGATION:
A PROBLEM THAT NEEDS A SOLUTION*
RICHARD SCRUGGS, SECOND PANELIST*
I am going to do my best, and there is going to be a test at the end of
what I say. Anybody who can find anything about insurance in what I say
is going to get a gold star. We have been wrestling with how to blend
tobacco litigation into a discussion on the principles of insurance and
insurance fraud; however, I will provide an account of what is going on
with tobacco litigation.
Right now, sixteen states have filed suit against the tobacco industry
to recover the health care costs of treating indigent smokers with tobaccorelated illnesses.' Part and parcel of these lawsuits are efforts to enjoin
marketing techniques that appeal to teenagers and adolescents. 2 While
smoking is declining among most adult populations, it has leveled off and
is even starting to increase among our youth, and that portends drastic
consequences in the future.
Between one and two of every ten health care dollars are spent
treating tobacco-related illnesses. 3 Furthermore, people who smoke and
get sick from using tobacco products are disproportionately among the
poor and disadvantaged. 4 My small state of Mississippi, for example, is
one of the poorest states in the country, with a large minority population.
We also have a large poor population and the highest percentage of
* 0Copyright

by Richard Scruggs 1997.

** Senior partner, Scruggs, Millette, Lawson, Bozeman & Dent. Richard Scruggs
is also a Fellow in the International Academy of Trial Lawyers.
1. Attorney General Michael Moore of Mississippi was the first to sue the tobacco
industry in an attempt to recover the state's health care expenses. See John Schwartz,
In Tobacco Suits, States Find Strength in Numbers; MississippiAttorney GeneralRallies
Coalition of Colleagues in Landmark Legal Battle, WASH. POST, May 18, 1997, at A6.
On March 13, 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that Attorney General Moore's
suit seeking to recoup the state's health care costs can go to trial. See MississippiHigh
Court Rejects Move to Block Tobacco Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at A3. As
of May 1997, 29 states had filed suit against the tobacco industry. See Schwartz, supra,
at A6.
2. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
3. See generally Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by PublicHospitals to Recover
Expendituresfor the Treatment of Disease,Injury and DisabilityCausedby Tobacco and
Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 81-103 (1994).
4. See id. at 87.
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population in the country on Medicaid.' One out of every five citizens
in our state is on Medicaid. That burden is straining our health delivery
system to the limit. This is not only true in Mississippi, but also true in
a lot of other southern and northern states. States like New Jersey,
Minnesota, Michigan, and Washington would not have joined this
litigation if the costs were not also straining their budgets.
Developing a legal theory that would fairly treat the tobacco industry,
the taxpayers of the state, and the smoker is the primary challenge in
trying to redress the enormous strain on our health delivery system that is
caused by tobacco. The traditional tort system was designed to redress the
balance between the manufacturer and the consumer of a product. Product
liability law, negligence law, and other such legal theories are based on
the relationship between manufacturer and consumer. However, in the
case of tobacco, the contest is not so much between the manufacturer and
the consumer, but between the third-party taxpayers who must pay for the
enterprise between the manufacturer and the consumer.
Is it fair to have the taxpayers stand in the shoes of the smoker, as in
a traditional subrogation case? Medicaid, in many ways, is like insurance.
It is not insurance in the traditional sense, because the insurer cannot
calculate a fee and assume a risk for a fee by contract. But, nevertheless,
it is not subrogation; it is not the traditional insurance relationship because
states and governments must treat their indigent sick. They have no
choice but to do that. They cannot decline coverage or the right of policy.
They must treat these people. They cannot let them die in the street,
regardless of whether they smoke, drink or lead other risky lifestyles.
In this light, what kind of legal theory properly redresses that balance,
where the relationship of manufacturer and smoker is causing a public
health crisis? We labored mightily to come up with legal theories that
would do that. What we did was resort to some very traditional legal
theories that have been part of Anglo-American jurisprudence for many
centuries: equitable theories of restitution, indemnity, quasi-contract and
public nuisance. While other theories that some of the states are using are
based on consumer fraud 6 and antitrust,7 all the states have, as the basis
5. See Peter T. Kilborn, Welfare All over the Map, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at
E3.
6. See State v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495-97 (Minn. 1996) (alleging
that Philip Morris violated consumer protection statutes relating to consumer fraud); see
also Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen: State
Lawsuitsfor Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 125 & n. 147

(1996).
7. See Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d at 495-96 (affirming a ruling that plaintiffs

have standing to pursue a claim against Philip Morris on grounds of statutory and
common law antitrust claims); see also Barnaby J. Feder, Texas Joins Other States in
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of their cases against the tobacco industry, used these equitable theories.
Despite these theories, the tobacco industry is not defenseless. It can
show that the state has unclean hands, that the state participated in the
activity by licensing it and receiving tax revenues from it. However, the
equitable theories do prelude the tobacco industry from setting up the
smoker's own conduct as a defense, because it is the relationship between
the smoker and the tobacco industry that caused the problem.
Another defense that has been raised by tobacco companies is "the
early death defense,"' which is essentially an economic defense. The
tobacco industry claims that smokers die an average of eight years earlier
than non-smokers and, therefore, it saves society the cost of pension and
geriatric care and various other expenses. 9 As a matter of law, that
defense does not lie, but it becomes absurd when taken to its logical
consequence. Suppose a driver kills a ten-year-old. Before the child dies,
he lingers on for a month in the hospital and runs up a bill of thirty or
forty thousand dollars. When sued by the parents of the child, the driver
defends by claiming that, had the child lived to be seventy-five years old,
his hospital bills would have been far in excess of thirty or forty thousand
dollars; therefore, the parents owe the driver money. The driver files a
counter-claim because he saved the parents money. So the principle
applies to tobacco litigation: killing people early is not an acceptable
defense to liability.
Another favorite defense of the tobacco industry is the "unclean
hands" defense mentioned earlier: states make money taxing tobacco.' °
Of course states make money taxing tobacco; yet they make money taxing
everyone for a variety of things, such as income and excise taxes.
Tobacco is not the only product that is subject to an excise tax, but it is
the only product with a body count. The fact that tobacco generates
money for state government is no different from the fact that anyone's
taxes go to support the federal government, as well as state and local
governments. Such tax monies are not earmarked for a particular disease
or for health care but are for the general conduct of government.
Taxes, quite simply, are not a damage deposit against which one can
injure the state to the extent one has paid taxes. And, in the case of
tobacco, the tobacco industry itself does not ever pay excise and sales
taxes: one hundred percent of those taxes is passed directly to the
consumer through price mark-ups. To begin with, the amounts of such
Suing Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1996, at B9.
8. See Peter Huber, Whose GoreIs Stalked?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 419 (1997).
9. See Gangarosa et al., supra note 3, at 85 n.19.
10. See Laura Manserus, Tobacco on Trial: Making a Casefor Death, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 5, 1996, § 4, at 1.
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taxes are woefully insufficient to compensate for all the sickness and death
that cigarettes cause.
The tobacco industry is also seeking to use the creation of economic
activity as a defense."
Their argument is that the process of
manufacturing and selling tobacco products generates jobs, income,
salaries and sales quite separate and apart from taxes and, therefore, if the
tobacco industry goes bankrupt, all that economic activity will be lost.
The industry is fond of claiming every convenience store clerk is a
tobacco job and they will talk about the tobacco industry in every state in
the country. Frankly, the "tobacco industry" is only in about five or six
states in our country, and there is no significant tobacco growing outside
those five or six states.
The claim that all these jobs and all this economic activity would be
lost if tobacco disappeared sounds appealing. But, would we really lose
all this economic activity? No, we would not. If people did not smoke,
if tobacco ceased to be sold today and people quit smoking today, the
money they spend on tobacco products would not go out of the economy.
The sixty or seventy dollars per month that a smoker spends on cigarettes
would not be thrown away. People would buy something else with it.
People would invest it. All the money would stay in circulation. No net
loss would occur if tobacco completely disappeared.
And, more
importantly, most of tobacco's economic activity is really an export of
currency from the non-tobacco states to the tobacco states. For example,
in Michigan, about one dollar out of every two is exported from the states
that do not grow tobacco to states that do.' 2 A number of studies have
documented that no economic benefit arises from the tobacco industry
3
outside the five or six states that grow tobacco.
Lately, some have advocated a legislative solution to resolve this
immense problem because the class action solution is not available.' 4
The class action is too complicated, and there are too many disparate
claims and disparate interests for a class action to resolve this. After the
11. See David Greising et al., Does Tobacco Pay Its Way, Bus. WK., Feb. 19,
1966, at 89 ("In the case brought by Mississippi ... tobacco industry lawyers have laid
the ground for a defense based on the economics of tobacco."); see also Scott
Richardson, Note, Attorney General's Warning: Legislation May Now be Hazardous to
Tobacco Companies' Health, 28 AKRON L. Rv. 291, 330-31 & n.341 (1995).
12. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., Employment Implications of Declining Tobacco
ProductSalesfor the Regional Economies of the United States, 275 JAMA 1241 (1996).
13. See Richardson, supra note 11, at 331 n.341.

14. See generally id.
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recent decisions in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.'5 and Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 6 the class action vehicle for resolving the
tobacco issue is no longer on the table. As a result, a number of us,
including some of the attorneys general and many in the public health
community, have embarked upon a potential legislative solution that will
resolve this enormous social problem. A number of issues exist that must
be addressed in any sort of solution like that. One of them is youth
smoking.
The Food and Drug Administration issued rules and regulations that
would restrict the advertising of tobacco products to ways that would not
appeal to youth. 7 That is not an insignificant problem, and it has to be
part of any solution-stopping any sort of appeal to youth. More than
eighty percent of all youth smokers are eighteen or under; yet the tobacco
industry likes to say the government is trying to make restrictions on the
sale of a legal product. Well, it's not legal if you're under eighteen and
that's where all the new smokers come from.' Less than ten percent of
smokers start smoking after age twenty, 9 so these restrictions have got
to be put on youth smoking.
Other issues exist as well: What to do about existing lawsuits? What
kind of compensation system can be set up for existing smokers? How
much should and can the tobacco industry pay to compensate sick smokers
and compensate the states and the federal government for the enormous
amount of money they are spending to treat tobacco-related illnesses? All
15. 83 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996) (denying class certification in proposed class action
against manufacturers of asbestos-containing products), cert. grantedsum nom. Amchem
Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
16. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing certification of class consisting of all
nicotine-dependent persons in the country who have purchased and smoked cigarettes
manufactured by tobacco companies).
17. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897); see also Joseph R. DiFranza
et al., RJR Nabisco'sCartoon CamelPromotes Camel Cigarettesto Children,266 JAMA
3, 149 (1991); Jeffrey Goldberg, Next Target: Nicotine, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1996, §
6 (Magazine), at 22; Peter T. Kilborn, Clinton Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette
Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al.
18. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396. See
generally DiFranza et al., supra note 17; Paul M. Fisher et al., BrandLogo Recognition
by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years, 266 JAMA 3, 145 (1991); John P. Pierce et al., Does
Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking?, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991).
19. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398. See
generally DiFranza et al., supra note 17; Fisher et al., supra note 18.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

of these are very difficult issues. The tobacco industry has done a
considerable amount of research on the behavioral and health effects of
tobacco products.2' What about that research? Can it be made public?
Should it be made public? Should the public be better informed about the
nature of nicotine and the addictive qualities of nicotine? What does the
tobacco industry really think about nicotine? What do their own test
results show? Not all of these studies are in the public domain, although
a few of them have started surfacing lately.2" But what the tobacco
industry knows and what the public knows about nicotine and its
pharmacological effects needs to be addressed for any sort of solution.
I think we are going to proceed along that path and, hopefully, there
will be some legislative solution to the tobacco problem. If it is not
worked out, I fear that it will continue to be a race to the courthouse by
a number of states who are seeking to get their money from the tobacco
industry, and the claims by these states are in the billions of dollars. As
big as the tobacco industry is, and as wealthy as they are, they cannot
respond to claims that big if they lose. Consequently, if one or two of
these states wins its lawsuit, it is going to be a bankruptcy situation for the
tobacco industry. There will be no alternative. This does not even
consider what happens to stock prices. Bankruptcy would be a bad
solution because nobody wins. In my opinion, it is the "Court of Bad
News."
To conclude, I hope that we will be able to come up with a legislative
solution to the tobacco problem. It will not be something that everyone
will like, but it will ideally fit the definition of a good
compromise-something that is equally satisfactory for everyone.

20. See Philip J. Hilts & Glenn Collins, Records Show Philip Morris Studied
Influence of Nicotine, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at Al; Tobacco Studies Detailed, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1995, at C7.
21. See Glenn Collins, Group Seeks a Reopening of Hearings on Tobacco, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1995, at A16; Tobacco Memo Advised Burying Adverse Study, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at A21; University to Display TobaccoDocuments, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1995, at A9.

SUBROGATION AND INSURANCE, WITH ESPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE TOBACCO LITIGATION
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THIRD PANELIST*

I must confess that Mr. Scruggs's presentation absolutely blew my
mind away. It was a virtuoso performance from which I have learned the
new definition of fairness. Fairness is a one-way transfer of wealth from
those who pay to those who receive it. But first a disclaimer. I have
worked with Philip Morris on a variety of tobacco cases for a long period
of time. When I appeared on this panel I was not planning to speak about
this topic. In light of what has been said, I will go on with my general
remarks, some of which do cover this issue of subrogation. I will steer
away, at least for the beginning, from the actual controversies that beset
us and concentrate on remarks that address the role of third-party
insurance for the defendant, before addressing the now controversial
questions of subrogation, which involve claims against a plaintiff by his
insurers.
In thinking of the two-party suit, the first question we ask ourselves
concerns the position of the defendant in the lawsuit. Normally when
liability rules are crafted, the standard common law methodology first
requires us to figure out the merits of the underlying case. When that is
done, the defendant then figures out its exposures under the applicable
law. Collective decisions about liability are made first; thereafter private
decisions about insurance follow. The insurance company will supply the
defendant with services, such as the defense obligation, and various kinds
of coverages. The theory is that the service obligation will be supplied at
lower cost and greater reliability when it is tied to the provision of
insurance than would otherwise be the case. The basic coverage
obligation in turn insulates the firm from the real downside that comes
from large hits. Essentially, insurance normalizes and equalizes the flow
of expected returns over future periods. One consequence, perhaps
unintended, of insurance is that it could easily influence the way in which
courts and juries think about underlying liability issues. Once judges and
plaintiffs' lawyers understand that insurance is available, they will use it
as a reason to increase the scope of liability. The traditional relationship
now works in reverse. First the insurance coverage is understood, and
then the liability is expanded in response. The presence of insurance
expands the class of insurable wrongs.
The role of insurance in shaping liability is a serious question, but it
covers only one side of the relationship. Equally important is the
symmetrical issue for plaintiffs. It is not only defendants who can get
* James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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insurance, but also plaintiffs. Sometimes, as we just learned, that
insurance comes in the form of Medicare and Medicaid. What typically
happens, for example, is that the patient of a physician who is faced with
certain kinds of risks asks himself what kinds of protections he would
want against those risks. Generally, most people understand that there is
a diminishing marginal rate of utility to money. At the same time, they
are very worried about certain kinds of adverse consequences, and they
are willing to take some of the money that they would have had at their
disposal in good times and to put it aside so that it will be available for
use in bad times. So they buy health insurance to try to maximize their
expected utility over all anticipated states of the world for all future
periods. The incentives here are similar to those that guide the defendants
in their decisions to purchase liability insurance.
First-party insurance over all its lines is a big industry. It is probably
bigger than the liability lines of coverage when property damage,
including that from catastrophic losses-hurricanes, tornadoes, floods-are
taken into account, along with disability and health insurance. By any
standard this is not a trivial part of the market. The thorniest legal
problems arise at the intersection of this first-party market with the thirdparty liability market. That overlap arises because many of the people
who are insured under various public and private programs also lead dual
lives as tort plaintiffs. The puzzle, or the squabble, then, crystallizes over
the prospect of overinsurance. More concretely, what happens when two
sources of recovery are available to an injured person, one from the firstparty insurance company and the second from the particular tort defendant
and its insurer, if any.
The mechanics of this relationship have proved very difficult to work
out. The controversy is less concerned with poverty, and more concerned
with apparent abundance. When viewing the situation at the back or
"wrong" end-that is, ex post-how many people would, by virtue of
being injured and getting full compensation from a tort defendant and
medical expenses from a first-party insured, feel they are now "better off"
than if they had never been injured before? The answer is in a sense
paradoxical. Most people would rather never be injured, even if they had
to forego benefit from a dual recovery. But at the same time, the relevant
question is whether they would, before the accident took place, choose to
indulge at their own expense in a system that promised them this double
recovery. The evidence from contracting behavior seems pretty clear.
Most people do not want to pay for double coverage of this sort. Since
they do not want to throw away the more substantial tort remedy when it
is available, they often strike deals in which they forgo the first-party
insurance that they would otherwise be entitled to receive. Since tort
payouts often take longer to obtain than first-party coverages, the deals
become a bit more complicated. The individual gets his first party
insurance pending the outcome of the tort litigation. If that proves
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successful, then it is under a duty to reimburse the first-party health
insurer for all or some predetermined portion of the medical expenses that
have already been paid out on his behalf. So a large cottage industry
develops to determine the conditions under which that reimbursement is
required. Thus the law of subrogation is born.
The scope of these arrangements is, moreover, not limited to
reimbursement after the tort recovery is obtained. Equally important are
decisions that determine the pattern of behavior prior to any tort recovery.
Does the injured individual or first-party insurer control the suit? Do they
split authority, and if so how? Who gets what kind of priority over the
recovered money. Recall that the ordinary tort suit involves pain and
suffering, which is normally not compensable by first-party insurance. It
also involves lost earnings which may be offset by disability insurance.
And finally, it covers the medical expenses, which are typically the object
of health insurance. Generally speaking there is no case for having the
first-party insurer recover for pain and suffering, which it did not bear.
But on the other hand, two items dividing the proceeds is more difficult.
Sorting out the nature of the recovery is a hard task to do in the abstract.
It seems that the right approach to this knotty problem is to let the two
parties-the subrogee, as it is sometimes called, and the victim-work out
between themselves a particular agreement that deals with each and every
portion of the tort recovery. And just that is done in many cases.
I can predict what the priorities in distribution would look like. For
the most part, it would end up with the insurance company getting back
its money first, not because it is the dominant and more powerful
party-that is not an argument that works well in competitive
markets-but, rather, because from an ex-ante perspective, people are
generally more concerned with their out-of-pocket expenses than they are
with their pain and suffering. They are trying to control their out-ofpocket expenses, and if they can reduce the front-end rates associated with
obtaining a given level of health coverage, generally speaking, they will
be prepared to sacrifice double recovery in a few cases for lower rates
across the board.
Once a case goes into litigation, however, one's view of the merits
and the justness and, I dare say, the "fairness" of the subrogation rules
starts to differ, as Mr. Scruggs's presentation makes all too evident.
Injured parties have peeked around the veil of ignorance, and they now
endorse state intervention on noncontractual principles to upset the
subrogation arrangement. These meddlesome activities are often disguised
as "equitable" remedies that allow persons who enter into contracts on one
kind of arrangement to repudiate that deal, and to keep the money that
they promised to pay over at the inception of the arrangement. It amounts
to treating a contractual obligation as an option not to honor the insurance
contract.
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I have been involved as a lawyer consultant for subrogees in the breast
implant cases. The entire episode was highly instructive because it casts
traditional plaintiffs into the role of defendants. Their attitude is that they
do not have to worry about obligations under subrogation contracts. They
are simply annoyances. The subrogees should not be allowed to enforce
their rights as parties to the underlying litigation. The cooperation
obligations of the first-party insureds do not count. Disclosures need not
be made to prospective plaintiffs that their recoveries may be subject to
subrogation obligations. Massive resistance was in fact the order of the
day. How unfortunate! In a world which generates enough contention
under the tort system-as it exists in terms of controversies between
strangers-the only sound principle that one can deal with in these cases,
when looking at the plaintiff's side, is to allow the initial agreement to
control, both with respect to the control of the litigation and the
distribution of the proceeds, whether the money comes through litigation
or settlement.
Now, that is the issue that must be resolved between the subrogee and
its insured, the plaintiff. But what about their joint position against the
defendant? Here the main objective of these two parties, as plaintiffs, is
cooperation that allows them to achieve a jointly favorable outcome
against the defendant whether by litigation or settlement. In order to do
that they must reduce their costs in order to maximize the potential gain.
And if they fail to do so the entire litigation could easily founder on the
rocks of internal conflict.
So far we are dealing with the usual matter of tactics and strategy
which assume that the defenses legally available to the defendant are
neither increased nor reduced by any agreement that the subrogee reaches
with its insured. If I were to live in subrogee heaven, however, I should
like very much to eliminate that restriction with the stroke of a pen. I
would therefore be very eager to enter into a contract with my insured
which goes something like this: "In the event that you get injured, I may
sue the other party, and any defense that he has against you he will not
have against me." In this way, I can recover everything from him and not
have to worry about meddlesome defenses like preemption, contributory
negligence or assumption of risk.
Achieving that position is the closest that any lawyer could come to
the alchemist's dream of turning dross into gold. And that precisely is Mr.
Scruggs's position.1 What happens, as he says, is that governments, both
state and federal, have proved utterly incapable of administering and
controlling their Medicare and Medicaid budgets. Yet the question of
direct reform is painful and is sure to counter political resistance from
1. See Richard F. Scruggs, Tobacco Litigation: A Problem that Needs a Solution,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 487 (1997).
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well-oiled interest groups that profit from the continued downward spiral
of these programs. But there is a light at the end of the tunnel. The more
inept the management of these programs, the more substantial the
recoveries they should obtain from the tobacco companies for tobaccorelated illnesses. They achieve this winsome result by persuading state
legislatures or state courts that their subrogation agreements with their
patient base should read: "We will pay your medical expenses on the
condition that none of those meddlesome defenses that could have been
asserted against you can be asserted against us."
I am going to have to make a confession now. I studied legal history
at Oxford. I am one of the few people who actually teaches Roman law.
To describe Mr. Scruggs's position on tobacco as "revisionist" of the
established legal position would be, I think, to flatter it unduly. I think
one can look through the length and breadth of the common law and the
civil law and find it utterly barren of any indication that the assignment of
a claim from A to B allows B to ignore contractual defenses that C could
assert against A. The basic common law rule has always been (both in
law and in equity, for on this point "equity follows the law,") that an
assignee always takes subject to defenses. And surely it could never be
otherwise if the alchemist's dream is to be foiled. Worried about the
statute of limitations, a setoff, a breach of condition, a statutory defense,
no matter. Sell the claim to the right third party and these defenses will
all vanish. The risk of strategic behavior between plaintiffs and subrogees
is so manifest that I am not aware of any precedent in any court, statute,
or treatise, which countenances this brash maneuver. The legal theory,
such as it is, depends on the fertile imagination of Mr. Scruggs and one
of his most distinguished legal advisors, Professor Laurence Tribe. It has
no known origins anywhere else.
Mr. Scruggs must recognize that the basic tidal wave of precedent is
against him, so he has to work hard to explain why his case is distinctive.
And he claims that the state is under a legal obligation to supply medical
care and thus should not be treated as a "mere volunteer." But this
argument surely fails. The first point is that the "mere volunteer" rule
makes eminently good sense. It cannot be the case that A can recover a
fortune from B by first paying for C's medical bills. What A gets from
B, what the state gets from its Medicare and Medicaid patients, is an
assignment of their causes of action against the tobacco companies, which
in turn are subject to defenses, just as the traditional law of subrogation
provides.
But it will then be said that Medicare and Medicaid are different
because federal obligations mandate that states expend their resources to
counteract the harmful effects of smoking. So states are not mere
volunteers after all.
Rather they are acting under some external
obligation. But again the argument misses the point. The obligation in
this case is imposed by a third party, the United States government. As
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such, it takes the form of another unfunded mandate. Surely the right
answer is for the states and the federal government to work their
disagreements out between themselves. It is not to export them onto tort
defendants. The remedy for the state is to insist that federal revenues be
used to fund the discharge of state obligations. It creates far too much
risk of collusive behavior between state and federal government to allow
the federal compulsion of state action to create remedies against individual
defendants that would otherwise not exist. That rule would be regarded
as virtually self-evident in contexts apart from tobacco. It seems as
though it should be regarded as self-evident in this context as well. If A
and B by contract cannot impose obligations on C, then A by command to
B cannot unilaterally impose obligations on C either.
All this is not to say that Medicare and Medicaid can do nothing to
control expenses. Consider, for example, these points. Presently the
Medicare and Medicaid programs make no provision for differential
premiums for smokers and nonsmokers. But there is no reason in
principle why both governments could not, if they so choose, charge
differential premiums for smokers to cover their increased risk of various
types of covered illnesses. That approach would create incentives to
reduce the level of smoking, and it also would reduce any implicit subsidy
that nonsmokers are forced to pay for the benefit of smokers. But that
solution has thus far fallen on deaf ears. Yet it is one that is commonly
followed by private insurers that take smoking into account in their
underwriting practices. It could, and perhaps should, be done here.
No matter how one thinks about the matter, therefore, the one fixed
piece of the legal environment is the traditional rule that requires
subrogees to take subject to defenses against their subrogors. That rule
was traditionally respected in all Medicare and Medicaid contexts which
required subrogation from recipients, but did not, as the recent wave of
lawsuits have tried to do, circumvent that requirement.
That in turn brings us back to why it is so imperative for Mr. Scruggs
to do an end-run around established law. The individual lawsuits have
foundered on a mix of causation and assumption of risk defenses (not to
mention preemption) that have a sturdiness before juries not appreciated
by the popular press. The ambiguity on causation is one that is deep in
the law. Does it mean that if something is done (a blow to the skull) then
something else necessarily follows (death), which otherwise would not
have happened before. Is the world one, where the probability of death
without the defendant's act is zero, but with it becomes one-a strictly
deterministic universe. Recent theoretical developments in causation have
suggested that very few cases fit into this strong push/pull, on/off
category. Rather most cases of causation often contain probabilistic
assertion, such that the occurrence of defendant's action (the discharge of
toxins) increases the risk or hazard of injury to the plaintiff. No longer
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do we have the on/off category. Rather, we have a higher probability of
harm conditional upon the defendant's action than without it.
Smoking surely fits into this increased risk or hazard category. But
once that becomes the relevant causal argument, then it makes far more
plausible the assumption of risk defenses, which when all is done say that
some people are prepared to assume an increased risk or hazard in order
to obtain some other benefit or pleasure which they regard as of equal or
greater value. In this calculation it surely helps the tobacco companies
that nicotine is a generic constant whose chemical and psychological
characteristics have been well ventilated in the popular press and medical
literature for years. It becomes credible therefore to insist that these risks
are of common knowledge so that they are assumed by individuals who
choose to smoke. And it strengthens that case that many who choose to
smoke also choose to vary the quantity of cigarettes they consume, the
type of cigarettes they consume, and in many instances to quit altogether.
The aggregate pattern of behavior looks as though as the perceived price
of smoking increases the level of consumption goes down. Putting all this
information together in concentrated form amounts to a formidable defense
that has thus far persuaded most juries and most courts, regardless of their
sympathies to the tobacco industry. Yet the new lawsuits by avoiding the
typical subrogation requirements utterly eviscerate the core of the available
defenses.
So what should be done? People can decide to stop smoking. Or,
the government can decide that it is not going to provide smokers with this
kind of insurance without making the needed risk adjustments. The
government can impose a tax and then simply say that it will not go into
general revenues, but it will have to be sufficient to cover the number of
smoking-related illnesses. The government might even, God forbid,
decide that it is going to ban tobacco on the grounds that the external costs
are not worth it. But, the one alternative that is absolutely unacceptable
is precisely the one that Mr. Scruggs pronounces as "fair." As Mr.
Scruggs has put the proposition to us, first, we play the game under the
conventional rules, and now that we have had a history of fifty years, we
will retroactively impose a system of liability-which nobody dreamed of.
We are tempted to call this new-found invention more ancient than
Methuselah, and thus cloak our inventiveness in the veil of history.
And I thought that tort litigation was approaching some level of
parity, fairness, and balanced playing fields. But what some now want to
do is redefine the playing field so that somebody who comes in,
technically, as an assignee, now has an independent claim. What the
government is constitutionally able to do on this world-view is pass
legislation that says the tobacco companies owe it X billion dollars. That
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is basically what is happening. Years ago, when I wrote Takings,2 I
claimed that anytime liability rules are modified, anytime land use
regulations are imposed, anytime new taxation is imposed, there has been
a taking, and the issue that remains to be settled is either that of statejustification or state-compensation. Little did I know how true that was
until I heard the proposals Mr. Scruggs now advocates. What makes it
worse, in constitutional terms, is that the state is an interested party, and
the state is preparing legislation that will grease the skids to its greater
success. So what really makes me absolutely irate is the thought that
somehow, the way that the public can win this dispute is for interested
citizens to vote in a legislature that they conveniently control a claim to
the cash that they wish to have.
In this sorry state of affairs, it seems to me that not only do we have
takings issues, but we have rather rudimentary concerns of procedural due
process, where an interested party is trying to pretend it is some sort of
dispassionate individual.
I have encountered more than a few
unmeritorious lawsuits, but few as unmeritorious as this one. Indeed I
think that the popularity of this present technique stands in inverse
relationship to its intellectual coherence and strength. In principle, I do
not understand how one could put this idea forward with a straight face.
Perhaps three hundred billion dollars offers three hundred billion reasons
to persuade me to think otherwise.

2. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DoMAIN (1985).

PROSECUTION OF INSURANCE FRAUD IN PHILADELPHIAA NEW PARADIGM
THE HONORABLE LYNNE ABRAHAM, FOURTH PANELIST*

Had I known that the Federalist Society was not a stuffy group of
intellectual giants, but was, instead, a convivial and jovial assemblage of
great mental giants, I would have come here much earlier. I am
exceedingly grateful to the society for inviting me to participate. I fear
that Mr. Epstein is a very difficult act to follow.
I am delighted to be here to give you my view of what prosecutors
can do in the civil field, and I have been asked specifically to talk about
my assessment of insurance fraud and the "crisis" that it has become.
First, prosecutors do, in fact, use civil law and civil litigation. My
office, in particular, has used civil litigation and civil law in our nuisance
pursuits. For example, we seek to close nuisance establishments by use
of civil litigation, and we use civil asset forfeiture. Of course, we apply
for injunctive relief. And certainly, in the field of legislation, we have
actively and consistently lobbied for changes in a variety of contexts that
affect civil law. Most notably, but not exclusively, we lobbied for the
Prison Litigation Reform Act,' which Congress just passed in 1995.
I would like to start with some concrete examples of insurance and
disability fraud that we prosecutors have pursued. The first is a story that
got everybody's attention, at least in Philadelphia. The Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, in an attempt to test its emergency
preparedness, staged an accident with an empty and out-of-service train.
Ambulances were summoned to the scene, sirens blazing, lights flashing,
police vehicles were there, and a variety of assorted actors and actresses
were dutifully strapped to boards, put in various braces and restraints and
were "carted off" to the hospital, to show how quickly ambulances could
respond, how well the police would handle the situation, and what the
driver would do. 2 Whereupon, a woman came upon the scene, having
nothing to do with the staged performance, and walked up to an officer
and said, "Officer, I was on that train. My neck is killing me. Would you
please see to it that I am taken to a hospital right away."
The officer, not missing a beat, said, "Yes, ma'am. I'm going to get
you a board. I want you to sit down right here." She was dutifully
strapped to the board. Everybody was in on it except for the unfortunate
* District Attorney, Philadelphia. Ms. Abraham is also a former judge of the Court

of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.
1. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3626 (1996).
2. See Rita Giordano, Woman Gets Jail in SEPTA Fraud, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
29, 1995, at B5.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

woman. She was taken to the hospital, where she complained of
extraordinary pain and terrible soft tissue injury. None of it, of course,
could be verified on x-rays or examination because it was non-existent.
She is now comfortably in Sconston, a prison, serving her sentence. 3
Another incident involved a city employee of some duration who had
taken a frolic of his own at lunch, went to a local oyster house, "slipped
on catsup," and feigned a disability. He sought, and received I might add,
a total disability for life, because at one point during his lunch he
discussed city business. When he was caught on film doing all kinds of
things that a disability would not allow for, he was, of course, properly
denied his money, and he is being prosecuted, as well. 4
More seriously, a woman had the misfortune of allowing an intruder
into her house in South Philadelphia. The intruder first knocked on the
door but, ultimately, forced his way into the house and shot her twice in
the head in full view of her children. It later turned out that this woman
had been subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury the very next
day to give testimony about an attorney who had conducted a large scale
series of fraudulent claims against insurance companies. The attorney is
now serving a life sentence in a federal prison for the contract killing of
this grand jury witness.5
As a last example, in D.C., a case is now pending where a gentleman
believed that his fiance had taken out an insurance policy naming him
beneficiary, so he managed to have her killed in anticipation of receiving
the insurance proceeds. It turned out that she had not yet made him the
beneficiary of the policy.6 He made a little mistake: bad timing.
These examples involving frauds cover things that interest the
prosecutors and, up until very recently, at least in Pennsylvania, were
unavailable to be redressed other than through investigation and denial of
the claim.
While insurance companies were certainly ready, willing, and able to
deny coverage to a party on allegations of insurance fraud, without
prosecutorial teeth the insurance company was left to shake its finger at
the offending person or persons, lawyers, physicians, and others, and then
deny coverage. However, the culprits were still allowed to go off onto
the next case, where perhaps their efforts would be more fully rewarded.
3. See id.
4. See Robin Clark, Did City PensionBoard Slip Up?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 26,
1991, at B1.

5. See United States v. Burke, No. 92-00268-01, 1992 WL 333578 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
6, 1992), aft'd, 31 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995).
6. See Arlo Wagner, Killing Linked to Insurance Policy, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1996, at B1.
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Workers compensation fraud; arson, whether real or bogus, of boats,
buildings and other things; auto theft, whether prearranged to avoid paying
further monthly payments to a bank or some company; staged accidents;
and health care fraud have now become a one hundred billion dollars a
year industry involving ambulances, labs, hospitals, doctors, tests, false
billing, kickbacks, unapproved devices, and unlicensed personnel. It is
obviously of interest to prosecutors all over this country.
In Pennsylvania, especially in Philadelphia, our problems are
particularly acute, where for every one hundred accidents there are
seventy-five bodily injury claims, many of which are totally bogus. And,
since pain and suffering is the way we assess how much damages a person
is really going to get-it is a reimbursement of expenses plus a multiple
for pain and suffering-multiple meds always encourage exacerbation and
exaggeration of claims, as does, of course, the health care industry. It is
estimated that in Philadelphia alone three hundred million dollars a year
in phoney claims are submitted for collection.' And, to make matters
worse, half of the drivers in Philadelphia have no license at all, so we
have unlicensed, uninsured motorists. Thus, in Philadelphia, if you are
in an automobile accident, you have a one-in-two chance that the other
person is neither licensed nor insured. And, because the value of the
assets of the party at fault is zip minus a million, guess who is going to
be sued? Not the zip minus a million. You, the person, who, hapless
though you might be, has insurance coverage.
Only those who have assets to protect are going to get insurance, not
the person who has really nothing to protect, and traditional legal
mechanisms have not proved appropriate merely because the person
without insurance can be sued. He has nothing against which to register
the judgment except his name, which is useless. Sometimes, the car is not
worth the insurance premium that is attached to it. Fines through other
traditional means have been uncollectible, and, besides, the value of the
car is worth less and the cost of insurance is worth more, so the
possibility of an assessment of fine is really no deterrent at all.
Enter District Attorney Lynne Abraham, who said the insurance
companies, as well as the City of Philadelphia-which always complains
about people who do not remit appropriate funds to the coffers of the City
of Philadelphia, but are unwilling to staff a district attorney to try to
collect them through a variety of means-suffer the same fate. As a result
of legislative efforts, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania legislature
created, two years ago, an Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority,' as well
7. See David I. Turner, 8 Chargedwith Insurance Fraud, PILA. INQUIRER, Jan.

25, 1996, at B13.
8. See Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701-301

(West 1995).
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as an Automobile Theft Prevention Authority. 9 The insurance fraud
covers every kind of insurance, from apples to zinc.
As a result of these two enactments, a real change in prosecution
efforts has occurred. Not only has my office, in a task force fashion,
joined federal prosecutors to prosecute all kinds of fraud, from health care
to anything else that is covered by federal statute, but we have also begun
our own insurance fraud unit, which has approximately twenty-five total
staff members-ten detectives, six lawyers, and the rest support staff.
Now, criminal referrals by insurance companies carry certain risks,
and there are certain benefits. Obviously, when coverage is denied, bad
faith is always claimed by the insured. Also, claims are delayed
significantly in their capacity or ability to be resolved.
There may be, and frequently are, requests for stays of civil
proceedings pending the disposition of the criminal case. Also, the
insurance company loses control because prosecutors will never allow
insurance companies to dictate prosecutorial policy. This is not a case for
quick settlement where we assess the risks and the benefits; this is a
prosecutorial criminal case, which the insurance company has no control
over, and, obviously, we control the flow of information, not the other
way around.
But there are many benefits, some of which have been spoken of
previously, some of which have been found in the materials that are easily
accessible to this group, and they are the following, but in no particular
order of importance: Referrals for criminal prosecution, as opposed to the
typical civil solutions, are the best opportunity for a company to make a
financial recovery. There are better investigative efforts, and we utilize
the investigative efforts of insurance companies to find out what really
happened. We not only use our own criminal capacities, which are
unavailable to insurance companies-for example, court-ordered wiretap
and electronic surveillance-but, obviously, we make insurance companies
do better work, because if we are going to take a case, we want to make
sure they are doing their best efforts, not their far-from-best efforts. We
also, of course, recognize that parallel civil suits may be filed. So there
is both a civil and a criminal opportunity for resolution. There is also the
possibility of asset forfeiture, civil in rem, and criminal in personam
proceedings.
Furthermore, the convict, if convicted, is obviously faced with the
possibility, especially in federal litigation, of being estopped from denying
in a civil action that any offense ever occurred. Also, the defendant is
forced into a position of recognizing that if they are in serious peril of
9. See Automobile Theft Prevention Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3601 (West
1995).
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criminal prosecution, state or federal, they should disgorge profits and
make restitution early in order to avoid a harsher penalty.
In any event, it does force a defendant to make restitution early in
order to avoid penalties, and there is nothing better than going before a
jurist at the time of sentencing and saying, "Your Honor, I have
recognized the error of my ways, and I have given the insurance company
all this money and more, so please consider that in sentencing."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a great deterrent
value. When I went before the plaintiffs' bar and told them, guess what,
we have an insurance fraud authority, it was like asking, "Do you want
the rack or the whirlpool? Pick your poison." There was great wailing
and gnashing of teeth, and I said, "Listen, you will find that in six months
time, no later, we will be your newest best friend, because we are not
interested in prosecuting attorneys. What we are interested in is deterring
attorneys from considering taking any case which has that faint, but
unmistakable, odor of fraud, which gets stronger and stronger the closer
one digs."
It also does have a deterrent effect when people know that these
companies are strong proponents of referring cases to a prosecutor. No
insurance company is compelled to refer cases to us. It is voluntary on
their part. But, it seems to me that insurance companies do know when
prosecutorial efforts are available to them. Additionally, people are less
likely to attempt fraud when they know that we are watching and that we
have resources available to us not available to insurance companies. So
I think they really have second thoughts about it.
I think that this is something that really needs to be taken seriously by
everybody. While we applaud the efforts of civil litigation and think it is
a very important thing for consumers, this is a consumer issue for us, and
a fortuitous happenstance that we are in a position to prosecute insurance
fraud, the engine that drives so many of the rip-offs in every state of this
union.

PANEL THREE:
AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
QUESTION: I was wondering if any of you have any views about the
use of social science surveys to determine the prospective size of the pots
that damages would be paid out of in these class action suits.
PROFESSOR RICHARD EPSTEIN: Yes. The problem in these cases
is to ask whether we can get an accurate reading from some small sample
of cases that will tell us the distribution of outcomes in the larger pool.
The difficulty of this mission-and it is one revealed in the asbestos
cases-is that it is often difficult to figure out how to get the representative
sample.
One possible technique is for one party to identify a series of cases to
which it then attaches financial evaluations. The other side can then pick
from that array of cases those that it wishes to try. If the outcomes are
set too high by the first to choose, then the penalty is that a low
percentage of the claimed damages will be awarded, and that number
could then be used to determine the allowable fraction of each claim
within the larger class. So it is another version of the "you cut, I pick"
game which seeks to get an honest revaluation of preferences from both
sides. But the level of variation in tort damage awards is very high, even
when the identical case is tried before multiple juries, and there is always
the chance that the damages for a particular case will change over time as
the injury or illness progresses. Let a claimant die before the appropriate
trial, and all calculations of damages must immediately be revised.
Working this kind of system therefore requires an exquisite attention
to detail. I would be reluctant to try it first on a large and complex set of
cases, such as those in asbestos, before trying it out somewhere else,
perhaps with a set of liquidated damage claims that almost by definition
admit to better estimation techniques. Indeed the vastness of the judicial
administration question in the asbestos case should lead to still a more
profound reexamination of what is going on. What brings all these cases
into court under a set of rules that has proved to be so unworkable?
QUESTION: This is for Mr. Scruggs and Professor Epstein. The
tobacco discussion today has been educational and frightening. I was
wondering two things about the litigation. First of all, if I may mention,
the states make, or the states have to give, these benefits. I am wondering
why that is, and if it is required by the federal government, then are you
really directing your complaint to the federal government or to states'
decisions to participate in the programs that lead them down this road to
providing these benefits?
And the other thing is-this is more so towards Professor Epstein, but
maybe this argument has come up-has anyone in the litigation brought up
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a political questions argument that this whole issue is just a legislative
matter involving whether these benefits are offered to begin with and that
the courts really have no role in it at all?
RICHARD SCRUGGS: The answer to whether states must provide
these benefits is, in most cases, yes. States have a compact with their
citizens; that is why governments exist. And, one of the major roles of
government, although I am sure there are people who would disagree with
me, is to provide for the sick and the socially disadvantaged some
minimum safety net of social services.
I think the debate today in this country is over where that safety net
should be, not whether it should be. States must provide certain health
care for indigent people. They have been unable, until presently, to
distinguish between smokers and non-smokers.
They have to pay
regardless of the lifestyle of the indigent.
QUESTION: Do you mean as a matter of constitutional right in their
state or as a matter of statutes?
MR. SCRUGGS: It is a matter of constitutional right in our state. I
cannot answer for all states, but in our state, we must do that, and we
must take advantage of federal programs like Medicaid for the benefit of
our citizens. We are a very poor state, and if the government does not
take care of our indigent population, they are going to die in the street.
And that is not acceptable, at least in my way of thinking about things.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: The situation just outlined is simply one
where you and I will make a compact that will allow us to impose costs
upon third parties. That is quite different from the kind of compact that
I regard as potentially viable. Let the citizens who decide to create these
universal rights fund them out of general revenues, But once we abandon
that constraint and allow retroactive revision of liability rules to hit
identified third parties, where do we stop? Why does this principle only
apply to tobacco, when it could extend to any other situation in which
subrogation is an issue. We only get a respectable political outcome when
the same persons who claim the credits from political action are prepared
to bear the debits as well. We should never allow government to impose
costs on an identified group of individuals or firms by legislation.
Externalization of harm leads to resource imbalances whether done by
contract or by statute, or by judicial decision. And that of course is the
point of the Mississippi scheme. It is an effort to extract revenues earned
from activities elsewhere and to funnel them into Mississippi. Oddly
enough, Mr. Moore has strong reasons for other states not to imitate his
dubious scheme if he could be assured of success acting on his own.
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QUESTION: Professor Epstein, I wonder if you would consider the
Mississippi-type litigation somewhat less disdained if it was formulated as
an alternative to private recovery. That is, are we not actually involved
in a choice here between the use of public law or private law?
We were told this morning that class actions, as a means of private
recovery, have a number of shortcomings among them: there are excessive
attorneys' fees, perverse incentives, and disparate interests. Nonetheless,
we undertake these, all in an effort to overcome the quite considerable
transaction costs that prevent claimants with relatively minor damages
from prosecuting their lawsuits.
So under these circumstances, isn't this the type of situation where we
ordinarily would invoke public law, so-called "quasi-criminalization" of
certain mass torts, whereby culpable defendants pay fines into the public
coffers, and then some administrative process is set up so that claimants
with not minor claims are able to lay access to the public coffers as
recovery?
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Deciding what vehicle is best to litigate mass
torts is a vexed question. But with the tobacco claims we should be aware
that one of the arguments for amalgamation into class suits is not tenable.
We do not deal here with a collection of small claims. The individual
damages sought in these actions are those comparable to other actions that
are brought individually. The actions are maintainable therefore under
ordinary doctrines and procedures.
There are also problems when the emphasis shifts from class actions
to administrative remedies, from private to public laws. When I wrote
Takings, I came to the conclusion that we should be very careful about
discontinuities between the private and public law. We did not want to
create situations whereby ordinary neighbors could decide to vote for
restrictions without compensation when acting alone they would have to
purchase restrictive covenants for hard cash. If one group of neighbors
could not get an injunction as of right in ordinary litigation, why should
they be able to achieve that outcome in the political process? Keeping
compensation in the public area where it is required for analogous private
actions helps prevent some serious slippage between the two areas.
On this view, the shift from private to public remedies depends not on
the reclassification of the right, but on the efficiency of the remedies.
Collective action is welcome where disorganized citizens could not
organize to bring valid legal claims. It is designed not to create a new
generation of political rights, but to secure more effective enforcement of
rights that are already recognized under the private law.
Whether we speak of tobacco or zoning, it is too easy to conflate the
possible justifications for public intervention. Too often legislatures think
that the shift to administrative law approaches justifies a new set of rights
when all it does is justify a more efficient enforcement of established
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rules. The single biggest conceptual mistake of the New Deal is to treat
public law as though it is separate and discontinuous from private law.
The constant refrain that one hears is that common law baselines do not
apply in a public area. The upshot is that politicians write on a blank slate
in dealing with legislation, where they can create vast amounts of
mischief. In the tobacco litigation, the moral is clear. It may well be that
consolidation of claims is appropriate for some efficiency reason. But if
it is, the consolidation should not serve as a pretext to eliminate all the
substantive defenses that would be available to the defendants against the
subrogees if litigation proceeded on a case by case basis. The government
subrogees should face the same obstacles as any private charity or
commercial insurer. It is the two-step transformation that I so strongly
oppose.
QUESTION: I am interested in Mr. Scruggs's response to some of
what Mr. Epstein had to say. I am especially interested in the part about
things, other than tobacco, coming under the principles laid out.
MR. SCRUGGS: Well, Mr. Epstein just took a page out of Philip
Morris's drill book. That is the party line, and he just gave it to you and
all of you probably recognize that for what it is.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Is it right or wrong?
MR. SCRUGGS: It is right for Philip Morris; it is wrong for the
country. Lawrence Tribe thought a great deal about the legal theories,
and, indeed, he did have a hand in these legal theories. This is not
something that Mike Moore and I, or Steve Boseman, cooked up.
Although, we had a large hand in it, too.
But, let us look at it this way. When one sells a product that, when
used as intended, kills four hundred thousand Americans a year; when one
laces his product with a substance called nicotine, which is an alkaloid that
one's own scientists say is as addictive as cocaine, morphine, or heroin;
when one spends six billion dollars a year to advertise that product to kids
who are younger than eighteen years old; when one's CEOs go before
Congress and state under oath that cigarettes are not harmful, not
addictive, and do not cause cancer; when one claims that killing people
early is a benefit to society; then it really doesn't matter what legal theory
we use. Five billion dollars is not enough.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Wait a second. If that argument is so
compelling, you should be able to win individual cases. I have not seen
you win them because you have not been able to meet the arguments on
the other side.
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There are choices; there are risks. People engage in certain forms of
behavior. The question we have to face is whether their knowledge is
complete or partial. It seems to me that what we have had in individual
tort cases is a complex causation argument. It does not take the form, "If
you smoke you die." It is a conditional probability. The moment you
recognize that account of causation, then you must confront the
assumption of risk argument.
Mr. Scruggs's theories, in effect, basically assert that anything
plaintiffs can say on their behalf is law and is sacred. Yet anything that
defendants can introduce into the litigation is some sort of undue
expression that ought to be expunged. It is this utter lack of balance that
characterizes your definition of "fairness."
QUESTION: Let me echo out of character and try to ask Professor
Epstein a tough question. I think Professor Epstein is as troubled as I am
about the retroactivity issue, which just seems to loom over most of the
others. In prohibition, we told the rum trust, equivalent of the cigarette
industry, that they could not produce their product after a certain date, but
it did not bankrupt them based on prospectivity. I think Professor Epstein
and I both object to the idea of statutes, like Florida's, that declare
retroactively that you owe us money based on your past conduct, and we
also object to the development of creative legal theory, which effectively
does the same thing.
What you are saying, though, Professor Epstein, is that it is a taking
for which compensation mechanisms might be appropriate. Retroactive
law, we will soon be finding out as they talk about settling this case, is
very much a two-sided street. Legal theories by plaintiffs, which may
indeed fly in some state courts, may be cut off under a settlement as a
condition of the settlement. And, if I understand you correctly, perhaps
they will have a takings claim if one day the supreme court of one or
another state, or just the trial court, says, "Yes, cigarette claims are legal
from this day on." Five days later, there is some legislative solution.
Does every smoker in that state acquire a takings right to get as much as
they would have gotten under those five days of law?
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: This is a genuine baffling question, and a
serious one, for it asks how we should handle transitions between legal
regimes. That problem is in turn still greater when products, or their
effects, only manifest themselves long after the original product has been
sold. And with tobacco, as with other products, my first instinct is that
products today should be judged, as far as possible, under the basic legal
regime under which they were sold. We should follow a consistent legal
practice over time.
On this view, if we should decide to change the legal rules, it should
be done prospectively-which with a product like cigarettes that has a
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continuous distribution is often difficult to do. But let us suppose that the
sharp cut can be made, and that cigarettes in the future are sold, even for
a period as short as five days, subject to an understanding that smokers
who use those cigarettes can recover tort damages without the interposition
of an assumption of risk defense. Now I regard that right as vested as
well, so that it could only be removed upon payment of just compensation.
How much compensation is owed could be difficult to determine. After
all, how much harm is done from just five days of smoking? But the
basic point is surely correct: once a legal regime, even an unsound legal
regime is in place, then its systematic repudiation may well create
compensation claims.
Still one caveat has to be entered, for there is some sense to the
recurrent concern that every change in the general law not create a right
of action. As a matter of construction it may well therefore be preferable
to read certain statutes in ways that do not create vested rights. Rather, the
statute itself is construed to create rights that are defeasible upon
subsequent revision.
With that said, it should be clear that any proposed revision in the
tobacco arena that calls for compensation should take certain particular
features. The funds in question should be collected at the time of sale,
perhaps through excise taxes. And it would probably be necessary to bar
the tort actions as a condition for putting the new funding mechanism in
place. The new legal regime and the new funding mechanism thus rise
and fall together.
Note also that compensation with funding mechanisms are only one
alternative. The question I would want to put to Mr. Scruggs is, is he in
favor of a flat out ban on cigarettes? I think that it would be a disaster
from his point of view because no plaintiff's lawyer ever made money
from products that were never sold. Until we decide that we are in favor
of the ban, with all the adverse consequences that we create, then it
becomes very difficult to act as though we should have banned past sales,
which we turn around and treat as wrongful acts. The proposed schemes
for retroactive imposition of liability should be regarded as inconsistent
with the rule of law.

